ADNL UDP - Internode
ADNL over UDP is used by nodes and TOS components to communicate with each other. It is a low-level protocol on top of which other, higher-level TOS protocols such as DHT and RLDP operate. In this article, we will learn how ADNL over UDP works for basic communication between nodes.
Unlike ADNL over TCP, in the UDP implementation, the handshake takes place in a different form, and an additional layer is used in the form of channels, but other principles are similar: encryption keys are also generated based on our private key and the peer's public key, which is known in advance from the config or received from other network nodes.
In the UDP version of ADNL, the connection is established in the same time with the receiving of initial data from the peer if the initiator sent 'create channel' message, the channel's key will be calculated and the channel creation will be confirmed. When the channel is established, further communication will continue inside it.
Packet structure and communication
First packets
Let's analyze the initialization of the connection with the DHT node and obtaining a signed list of its addresses in order to understand how the protocol works.
Find the node you like in global config, in the dht.nodes section. For example:
{
"@type": "dht.node",
"id": {
"@type": "pub.ed25519",
"key": "fZnkoIAxrTd4xeBgVpZFRm5SvVvSx7eN3Vbe8c83YMk="
},
"addr_list": {
"@type": "adnl.addressList",
"addrs": [
{
"@type": "adnl.address.udp",
"ip": 1091897261,
"port": 15813
}
],
"version": 0,
"reinit_date": 0,
"priority": 0,
"expire_at": 0
},
"version": -1,
"signature": "cmaMrV/9wuaHOOyXYjoxBnckJktJqrQZ2i+YaY3ehIyiL3LkW81OQ91vm8zzsx1kwwadGZNzgq4hI4PCB/U5Dw=="
}
- Let's take its ED25519 key,
fZnkoIAxrTd4xeBgVpZFRm5SvVvSx7eN3Vbe8c83YMk, and decode it from base64 - Take its IP address
1091897261and translate it into an understandable format using service or using conversion to little endian bytes, we will get65.21.7.173 - Combine with the port, get
65.21.7.173:15813and establish a UDP connection.
We want to open a channel to communicate with node and get some information, and as the main task - to receive a list of signed addresses from it. To do this, we will generate 2 messages, the first - create a channel:
adnl.message.createChannel key:int256 date:int = adnl.Message
Here we have 2 parameters - key and date. As a date, we will specify the current unix timestamp. And for the key - we need to generate a new ED25519 private+public key pair specially for the channel, they will be used for initialization of public encryption key. We will use our generated public key in the key parameter of the message, and just save the private one for now.
Serialize the filled TL structure and get:
bbc373e6 -- TL ID adnl.message.createChannel
d59d8e3991be20b54dde8b78b3af18b379a62fa30e64af361c75452f6af019d7 -- key
555c8763 -- date
Next, let's move to our main query - get a list of addresses. To execute it, we first need to serialize its TL structure:
dht.getSignedAddressList = dht.Node
It has no parameters, so we just serialize it. It will be just its id - ed4879a9.
Next, since this is a higher level request of the DHT protocol, we need to first wrap it in an adnl.message.query TL structure:
adnl.message.query query_id:int256 query:bytes = adnl.Message
As query_id we generate random 32 bytes, as query we use our main request, wrapped as an array of bytes.
We will get:
7af98bb4 -- TL ID adnl.message.query
d7be82afbc80516ebca39784b8e2209886a69601251571444514b7f17fcd8875 -- query_id
04 ed4879a9 000000 -- query
Building the packet
All communication is carried out using packets, the content of which is TL structure:
adnl.packetContents
rand1:bytes -- random 7 or 15 bytes
flags:# -- bit flags, used to determine the presence of fields further
from:flags.0?PublicKey -- sender's public key
from_short:flags.1?adnl.id.short -- sender's ID
message:flags.2?adnl.Message -- message (used if there is only one message)
messages:flags.3?(vector adnl.Message) -- messages (if there are > 1)
address:flags.4?adnl.addressList -- list of our addresses
priority_address:flags.5?adnl.addressList -- priority list of our addresses
seqno:flags.6?long -- packet sequence number
confirm_seqno:flags.7?long -- sequence number of the last packet received
recv_addr_list_version:flags.8?int -- address version
recv_priority_addr_list_version:flags.9?int -- priority address version
reinit_date:flags.10?int -- connection reinitialization date (counter reset)
dst_reinit_date:flags.10?int -- connection reinitialization date from the last received packet
signature:flags.11?bytes -- signature
rand2:bytes -- random 7 or 15 bytes
= adnl.PacketContents
Once we have serialized all the messages we want to send, we can start building the packet. Packets to be sent to a channel differ in content from packets that are sent before the channel is initialized. First, let's analyze the main packet, which is used for initialization.
During the initial data exchange, outside the channel, the serialized content structure of the packet is prefixed with the public key of the peer - 32 bytes. Our public key is 32 bytes, the sha256 hash of the serialized TL of the content structure of the packet - 32 bytes. The content of the packet is encrypted using the shared key, obtained from our private key and the public key of the server.
Serialize our packet content structure, and parse it byte by byte:
89cd42d1 -- TL ID adnl.packetContents
0f 4e0e7dd6d0c5646c204573bc47e567 -- rand1, 15 (0f) random bytes
d9050000 -- flags (0x05d9) -> 0b0000010111011001
-- from (present because flag's zero bit = 1)
c6b41348 -- TL ID pub.ed25519
afc46336dd352049b366c7fd3fc1b143a518f0d02d9faef896cb0155488915d6 -- key:int256
-- messages (present because flag's third bit = 1)
02000000 -- vector adnl.Message, size = 2 messages
bbc373e6 -- TL ID adnl.message.createChannel
d59d8e3991be20b54dde8b78b3af18b379a62fa30e64af361c75452f6af019d7 -- key
555c8763 -- date (date of creation)
7af98bb4 -- TL ID [adnl.message.query](/)
d7be82afbc80516ebca39784b8e2209886a69601251571444514b7f17fcd8875 -- query_id
04 ed4879a9 000000 -- query (bytes size 4, padding 3)
-- address (present because flag's fourth bit = 1), without TL ID since it is specified explicitly
00000000 -- addrs (empty vector, because we are in client mode and do not have an address on wiretap)
555c8763 -- version (usually initialization date)
555c8763 -- reinit_date (usually initialization date)
00000000 -- priority
00000000 -- expire_at
0100000000000000 -- seqno (present because flag's sixth bit = 1)
0000000000000000 -- confirm_seqno (present because flag's seventh bit = 1)
555c8763 -- recv_addr_list_version (present because flag's eighth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
555c8763 -- reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
00000000 -- dst_reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1)
0f 2b6a8c0509f85da9f3c7e11c86ba22 -- rand2, 15 (0f) random bytes
After serialization - we need to sign the resulting byte array with our private client's (not channel's) ED25519 key, which we generated and saved before. After we have generated the signature (64 bytes in size), we need to add it to the packet, serialize it again, but now add the 11th bit to the flag, which means the presence of the signature:
89cd42d1 -- TL ID adnl.packetContents
0f 4e0e7dd6d0c5646c204573bc47e567 -- rand1, 15 (0f) random bytes
d90d0000 -- flags (0x0dd9) -> 0b0000110111011001
-- from (present because flag's zero bit = 1)
c6b41348 -- TL ID pub.ed25519
afc46336dd352049b366c7fd3fc1b143a518f0d02d9faef896cb0155488915d6 -- key:int256
-- messages (present because flag's third bit = 1)
02000000 -- vector adnl.Message, size = 2 message
bbc373e6 -- TL ID adnl.message.createChannel
d59d8e3991be20b54dde8b78b3af18b379a62fa30e64af361c75452f6af019d7 -- key
555c8763 -- date (date of creation)
7af98bb4 -- TL ID adnl.message.query
d7be82afbc80516ebca39784b8e2209886a69601251571444514b7f17fcd8875 -- query_id
04 ed4879a9 000000 -- query (bytes size 4, padding 3)
-- address (present because flag's fourth bit = 1), without TL ID since it is specified explicitly
00000000 -- addrs (empty vector, because we are in client mode and do not have an address on wiretap)
555c8763 -- version (usually initialization date)
555c8763 -- reinit_date (usually initialization date)
00000000 -- priority
00000000 -- expire_at
0100000000000000 -- seqno (present because flag's sixth bit = 1)
0000000000000000 -- confirm_seqno (present because flag's seventh bit = 1)
555c8763 -- recv_addr_list_version (present because flag's eighth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
555c8763 -- reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
00000000 -- dst_reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1)
40 b453fbcbd8e884586b464290fe07475ee0da9df0b8d191e41e44f8f42a63a710 -- signature (present because flag's eleventh bit = 1), (bytes size 64, padding 3)
341eefe8ffdc56de73db50a25989816dda17a4ac6c2f72f49804a97ff41df502 --
000000 --
0f 2b6a8c0509f85da9f3c7e11c86ba22 -- rand2, 15 (0f) random bytes
Now we have an assembled, signed and serialized packet, which is an array of bytes.
For subsequent verification of its integrity by the recipient, we need to calculate packet's sha256 hash. For example, let this be 408a2a4ed623b25a2e2ba8bbe92d01a3b5dbd22c97525092ac3203ce4044dcd2.
Now let's encrypt the content of our packet with the AES-CTR cipher, using shared key, obtained from our private key and the public key of the peer (not the channel's key).
We are almost ready for sending, just remains to calculate ID of ED25519 peer key and concat everything together:
daa76538d99c79ea097a67086ec05acca12d1fefdbc9c96a76ab5a12e66c7ebb -- server Key ID
afc46336dd352049b366c7fd3fc1b143a518f0d02d9faef896cb0155488915d6 -- our public key
408a2a4ed623b25a2e2ba8bbe92d01a3b5dbd22c97525092ac3203ce4044dcd2 -- sha256 content hash (before encryption)
... -- encrypted content of the packet
Now we can send our built packet to peer via UDP, and wait for a response.
In response, we will receive a packet with similar structure, but with different messages. It will consist of:
68426d4906bafbd5fe25baf9e0608cf24fffa7eca0aece70765d64f61f82f005 -- ID of our key
2d11e4a08031ad3778c5e060569645466e52bd1bd2c7b78ddd56def1cf3760c9 -- server public key, for shared key
f32fa6286d8ae61c0588b5a03873a220a3163cad2293a5dace5f03f06681e88a -- sha256 content hash (before encryption)
... -- the encrypted content of the packet
The deserialization of the packet from the server is as follows:
- We check the ID of the key from the packet to understand that the packet is for us.
- Using the public key of the server from the packet and our private key, we calculate a shared key and decrypt the content of the packet
- Compare the sha256 hash sent to us with the hash received from the decrypted data, they must match
- Start deserializing the packet content using the
adnl.packetContentsTL schema
The content of the packet will look like this:
89cd42d1 -- TL ID adnl.packetContents
0f 985558683d58c9847b4013ec93ea28 -- rand1, 15 (0f) random bytes
ca0d0000 -- flags (0x0dca) -> 0b0000110111001010
daa76538d99c79ea097a67086ec05acca12d1fefdbc9c96a76ab5a12e66c7ebb -- from_short (because flag's first bit = 1)
02000000 -- messages (present because flag's third bit = 1)
691ddd60 -- TL ID adnl.message.confirmChannel
db19d5f297b2b0d76ef79be91ad3ae01d8d9f80fab8981d8ed0c9d67b92be4e3 -- key (server channel public key)
d59d8e3991be20b54dde8b78b3af18b379a62fa30e64af361c75452f6af019d7 -- peer_key (our public channel key)
94848863 -- date
1684ac0f -- TL ID adnl.message.answer
d7be82afbc80516ebca39784b8e2209886a69601251571444514b7f17fcd8875 -- query_id
90 48325384c6b413487d99e4a08031ad3778c5e060569645466e52bd5bd2c7b -- answer (the answer to our request, we will analyze its content in an article about DHT)
78ddd56def1cf3760c901000000e7a60d67ad071541c53d0000ee354563ee --
35456300000000000000009484886340d46cc50450661a205ad47bacd318c --
65c8fd8e8f797a87884c1bad09a11c36669babb88f75eb83781c6957bc976 --
6a234f65b9f6e7cc9b53500fbe2c44f3b3790f000000 --
000000 --
0100000000000000 -- seqno (present because flag's sixth bit = 1)
0100000000000000 -- confirm_seqno (present because flag's seventh bit = 1)
94848863 -- recv_addr_list_version (present because flag's eighth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
ee354563 -- reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1, usually initialization date)
94848863 -- dst_reinit_date (present because flag's tenth bit = 1)
40 5c26a2a05e584e9d20d11fb17538692137d1f7c0a1a3c97e609ee853ea9360ab6 -- signature (present because flag's eleventh bit = 1), (bytes size 64, padding 3)
d84263630fe02dfd41efb5cd965ce6496ac57f0e51281ab0fdce06e809c7901 --
000000 --
0f c3354d35749ffd088411599101deb2 -- rand2, 15 (0f) random bytes
The server responded to us with two messages: adnl.message.confirmChannel and adnl.message.answer.
With adnl.message.answer everything is simple, this is the answer to our request dht.getSignedAddressList, we will analyze it in the article about DHT.
Let's focus on adnl.message.confirmChannel, which means that the peer has confirmed the creation of the channel and sent us its public channel key. Now, having our private channel key and the peer's public channel key, we can calculate the shared key.
Now when we have calculated the shared channel key, we need to make 2 keys out of it - one for encrypting outgoing messages, the other for decrypting incoming messages. Making 2 keys out of it is quite simple, the second key is equal to the shared key written in reverse order. Example:
Shared key : AABB2233
First key: AABB2233
Second key: 3322BBAA
It remains to determine which key to use for what, we can do this by comparing the id of our public channel key with the id of the public key of the server channel, converting them to a numerical form - uint256. This approach is used to ensure that both the server and the client determine which key to use for what. If the server uses the first key for encryption, then with this approach the client will always use it for decryption.
The terms of use are:
The server id is smaller than our id:
Encryption: First Key
Decryption: Second Key
The server id is larger than our id:
Encryption: Second Key
Decryption: First Key
If the ids are equal (nearly impossible):
Encryption: First Key
Decryption: First Key
Communication in a channel
All subsequent packet exchange will occur within the channel, and channel keys will be used for encryption.
Let's send the same dht.getSignedAddressList request inside a newly created channel to see the difference.
Let's build the packet for the channel using the same adnl.packetContents structure:
89cd42d1 -- TL ID adnl.packetContents
0f c1fbe8c4ab8f8e733de83abac17915 -- rand1, 15 (0f) random bytes
c4000000 -- flags (0x00c4) -> 0b0000000011000100
-- message (because second bit = 1)
7af98bb4 -- TL ID adnl.message.query
fe3c0f39a89917b7f393533d1d06b605b673ffae8bbfab210150fe9d29083c35 -- query_id
04 ed4879a9 000000 -- query (our dht.getSignedAddressList packed in bytes with padding 3)
0200000000000000 -- seqno (because flag's sixth bit = 1), 2 because it is our second message
0100000000000000 -- confirm_seqno (flag's seventh bit = 1), 1 because it is the last seqno received from the server
07 e4092842a8ae18 -- rand2, 7 (07) random bytes
The packets in a channel are quite simple and essentially consist of sequences (seqno) and the messages themselves.
After serialization, like last time, we calculate the sha256 hash of the packet. Then we encrypt the packet using the key intended for the outgoing packets of the channel.
Calculate pub.aes ID of encryption key of our outgoing messages, and we build our packet:
bcd1cf47b9e657200ba21d94b822052cf553a548f51f539423c8139a83162180 -- ID of encryption key of our outgoing messages
6185385aeee5faae7992eb350f26ba253e8c7c5fa1e3e1879d9a0666b9bd6080 -- sha256 content hash (before encryption)
... -- the encrypted content of the packet
We send a packet via UDP and wait for a response. In response, we will receive a packet of the same type as we sent (the same fields), but with the answer to our request dht.getSignedAddressList.
Other message types
For basic communication, messages like adnl.message.query and adnl.message.answer are used, which we discussed above, but other types of messages are also used for some situations, which we will discuss in this section.
adnl.message.part
This message type is a piece of one of the other possible message types, such as adnl.message.answer. This method of data transferring is used when the message is too large to be transmitted in a single UDP datagram.
adnl.message.part
hash:int256 -- sha256 hash of the original message
total_size:int -- original message size
offset:int -- offset according to the beginning of the original message
data:bytes -- piece of data of the original message
= adnl.Message;
Thus, in order to assemble the original message, we need to get several parts and, according to the offsets, concat them into a single bytes array. And then process it as a message (according to the ID prefix in this bytes array).
adnl.message.custom
adnl.message.custom data:bytes = adnl.Message;
Such messages are used when the logic at the higher level does not correspond to the request-response format, messages of this type allow you to completely move the processing to the higher level, since the message carries only an array of bytes, without query_id and other fields. Messages of this type are used, for example, in RLDP, since there can be only one response to many requests, this logic is controlled by RLDP itself.
Conclusion
Further communication takes place on the basis of the logic described in this article, but the content of the packets depends on higher level protocols such as DHT and RLDP.
References
Here a link to the original article by Oleg Baranov.